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I A 
The effect of human behavior 
on the law 
By Jim Gibson 
icture a speed limit that starts at 55 miles per hou1; but then 
varies based on the speed of the cars that pass by. If the average 
speed is 60, the speed limit slowly adjusts toward 60. If the 
average speed is 50, the speed limit eventually becomes 50. 
This is an example of how real-world behavior might feed back 
into the law and help form a legal standard. Of course, speed limits 
don't really work this way (although enforcement of speed limits is 
another question). Yet this kind of "feedback loop" exists in a great 
many areas of the law. The law frequently derives its content from the 
Employers must make "reasonable accommodations" for their 
disabled employees. The list is endless. 
Yet within this familiar concept lurks a phenomenon that can 
lead the law astray. Consider again tort's "reasonable care" 
standard. Suppose a doctor is examining a swollen lymph node. 
After conducting a physical exam and taking X-rays, she is 
e 
e 
s 
nearly certain that the node is merely infected and that 
the patient should simply take some antibiotics. 
But the doctor is concerned about malpractice 
liability and the inherent uncertainty of the tort system. 
She knows that there is a chance, however small, that the 
swelling is cancerous-and if it is, a jury might find her 
liable for a faulty diagnosis even though she rightfully 
believes that she is exercising reasonable care and that she 
has done everything that her peers would do. She there-
fore over complies. She does more than the law demands. 
She orders an ultrasound, despite reliable medical evi-
dence that the procedure is unnecessary and wasteful. 
As an isolated incident, this overcompliance would 
not be particularly troubling. But if 1nost doctors react 
the same way to the specter of liability, wasteful practice 
will beco~e common_ practice. And once it does, it will 
eventually cease to constitute more-than-reasonable care, 
because reasonable care draws its definition from the 
typical conduct of ,those it regulates. The ultrasow1d's 
ubiquity will atcordip.gly make it part of the reasonable 
care standard, and doctors w4o fail to order an ultra-
sound will be judged negligent. In this way, overcautious 
practices feed back into doctrine, making negligence law 
more demanding and requiring doctors to use a medi-
cally unnecessary and wasteful diagnostic tool. 
This feedback loop can then repeat itself Now that 
the ultrasoWld represents mere compliance, rather than 
overcompliance, it no longer represents more care than 
the law demands. So the next time our overcautious 
doctor wants to give liability a wide berth, she may order 
not only an ultrasoWld, but a biopsy as well. And if 
her fellow doctors do the same, reasonable care ratchets 
upward once again, incorporating the use of a biopsy into 
the negligence standard. It's as if we have a self-adjusting 
speed limit, and no matter what it's set at, eve1yone 
exceeds it-so it keeps going up, and up, and up. 
Unfortunately, this is not mere theory. There is 
considerable evidence that malpractice pressures force 
doctors to practice "defensive medicine"-order more 
procedw·es, perform more tests, make more referrals, 
and so forth. This over-compliance eventually works its 
way back into the malpractice standard. 
\ Nor is evidence of the feedback effect 
· \ limited to medical malpractice. The feedback 
loop in other areas of tort law may be ~- .. ~') harder to see, but inconspicuous ·'\..~ 0 does not mean immate-\J "::~";;;:::·':;:: 
ingly fatuous warnings displayed on consumer goods, as 
manufacturers seek to avoid products liability by staying 
one step more conservative than the norm. Why else 
would one see this label on a box of nails: "CAUTION! 
Do NOT swallow nails! May cause irritation!" (I wish I 
were malcing that up.) 
We may also find feedback loops outside of tort 
law. Perhaps "reasonable accommodations" for disabled 
employees become progressively more accommodating, 
as risk-averse employers give federal disability law a 
wide berth. Or consider "reasonable expectations of pri-
vacy," the touchstone for determining whether a search 
is constitutional. Police operating in the shadow of this 
vague standard may consistently undercomply-that 
is, conduct illegal searches-knowing that the upside is 
great (the discovery of incriminatory evidence) and the 
downside unlikely (the exclusion of that evidence). If 
so, then the public might eventually grow accustomed 
to such intrusions, which means that our reasonable 
expectations of privacy would diminish, and our consti-
tutional rights would dutifully follow. Law enforcement 
would then have even more license to intrude on our 
privacy, and the cycle would begin anew. 
So what might we do about these feedback loops? 
It would be impossible to get rid of all those legal stan-
dards that derive from real-world practice. Nor would 
we want to, even if we could. When the law incorporates 
what people actually do, it grounds itself in the friendly 
and familiar territory of shared experience, of conven-
tional wisdom, of consensus. It's inherently democratic. 
Running away from reasonableness is no answer. 
In the end, the best we can hope for is that poli-
cymalcers temper their reliance on real-world practice 
when there's reason to believe that it departs from 
optimal behavior. In medical inalpractice, for example, \ ·~ <:<-'. ~ 
courts should malce more use of evidence from \ 't ~ 
practice in a given field. Reference to real-world 
practice inay seem both sensible and defensible, 
but the real world is never as simple as theory 
would lead us to believe. We must recognize 
instead that the ve1y doctrines that derive 
from practice can also distort it. II 
